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Abstract 
The degree of legal protection given to journalists’ sources in New Zealand and Australia has 
progressed considerably over the last 30 years. Both nations have moved from a landscape of 
virtually no source protection to a strong presumption against source disclosure. This paper 
examines the history of this progression, its merits and its shortcomings. It highlights a distinct 
‘Australasian approach’ to source protection and assesses this approach against other domestic 
and international methods in order to determine its effectiveness. It concludes that while 
source protection in New Zealand and the Commonwealth of Australia is relatively stable and 
comprehensive when compared to other jurisdictions, some refinement in approach is 
necessary in order to guarantee equitable protection for all journalists and their sources.  
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I Introduction 
Democratic society relies on the free flow of information to the public, particularly 
information about the use and abuse of power. It is the role of the media to provide such 
information and in order to so accurately and without fear of censorship or punishment, they 
are dependent on a number of basic press freedoms (See discussion of Goodwin v United 
Kingdom on p. 9). One such press freedom, and the focus of this paper, is the right of a 
journalist to protect their confidential sources. This right is critical as many sources would not 
come forward with information if they could not be confident that journalists would protect 
their identity.1  
Yet, despite the importance of source protection for a free press, the first explicit statutory 
recognition of this right anywhere in Australasia was not until 2006 when the New Zealand 
Parliament inserted s 68 into the nation’s Evidence Act.2 This section created a rebuttable 
presumption in favour of source confidentiality and vested sole discretion in determining when 
the public interest in disclosure will outweigh this presumption in the hands of judges of the 
High Court.3 It provided assurance to journalists that they would not be compelled to reveal 
their sources and also formed the backbone for journalistic protection laws in the 
Commonwealth of Australia, despite having being tested by the courts only once in the case 
of Police v Campbell. 4 
Some 8 years after the initial enactment of s 68, it is worth examining the success of this 
provision and the similarly worded provision in the Australian Commonwealth. This paper 
will explain why it is important that modern democratic nations provide journalists with strong 
guarantees of source protection and how other states have done so; examine whether s 68 and 
the shield laws in Australia provide sufficient protection for journalists; and discuss whether 
source protection on both sides of the Tasman Sea ought to be refined to provide clearer and 
more stringent protection for journalists.  
II The Right to Keep Sources Confidential: A Snapshot of Source 
Protection in Jurisdictions of Influence 
 
                                                             
1 Ruth Costigan “Protection of Journalist’s Sources” (2007) Public Law 464 at 464. 
2 Evidence Act 2006, s 68(1). 
3 Evidence Act, s 68(2). 
4 Police v Campbell [2010] 1 NZLR 483 (HC). 
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A Value of Source Protection 
Freedom of the press as a vehicle for comment on public issues is basic to a democratic 
system.5  It is protected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is considered 
fundamental to freedom of expression.6 It is awarded such high standing because the press 
bear responsibility for ensuring the public have a full and free flow of information.7 They are 
also charged with ensuring the public are well-informed about public issues and the people 
who represent them in places of power.8 The press, in this way, are the ‘public watchdogs’ of 
democratic society.9 Although they may be motivated by many considerations other than the 
high-minded task of informing the public, the public interest is served by their ability to 
uncover corruption, fraud and other anti-social behaviour.10 According to the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, “journalism is the primary manifestation of freedom of expression.”11 
Yet if they are to be effective in their role as a ‘public watchdog’, journalists need to be able 
to make sincere promises of confidentiality to sources that assist them in uncovering 
information. Much of the information which finds its way into the public domain is made 
available by individuals who would lack the resolve to give information if there were a risk 
that their identity may be disclosed.12 Confidentiality allows journalists to reassure such 
sources that they will remain anonymous, reducing fears of harm, embarrassment or legal 
entanglement.13 It gives journalists the ability to uncover corruption and misconduct in society 
that would otherwise be ignored or ‘swept under the rug.’14 As expressed by Lord Diplock, “if 
the identity of police informers were too readily liable to be disclosed in a court of law, the 
sources of information would dry up and the police would be hindered in their duty of 
preventing and detecting crime. Ordering journalists to disclose their sources can have similar 
consequences.”15  
                                                             
5 Costigan, above n 1, at 464. 
6 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (signed in 1948, entered into force 16 December 1949), art 19. 
7 Anthony L Fargo “The Year of Leaking Dangerously: Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journalists and the Uncertain 
Future of the Federal Journalist’s Privilege” (2006) 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J 1063 at 1073. 
8 Fargo, above n 7, at 1073. 
9 Observer and Guardian v the United Kingdom (13585/88) Court (Plenary), ECHR 26 November 1991. 
10 David Eady and ATH Smith Arlidge, Eady & Smith on Contempt (4th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2011) 
at 9-19. 
11 Kelly Buchanan “Freedom of Expression and International Criminal Law: An Analysis of the Decision to 
Create a Testimonial Privilege for Journalists” (2004) 35 VUWLR 609. 
12 Michael Douglas “A Broad Reading of WA’s Shield Laws” (2013) 18 MALR 377 at 381. 
13 Laurence B. Alexander “Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal Limiting the 
Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources and Information” 20 Yale 
Law & Pol. Rev. 97 (2002) at 104. 
14 David Banisar Silencing Sources: An International Survey of Protections and Threats to Journalists’ Sources 
(Privacy International, London, 2008) at 6. 
15 D v National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171, [1977] 2 WLR 201 (HL) at 218. 
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Although source protection may encourage sources with improper motives (be they malicious, 
vexatious or dishonest) to come forward with information, it will also encourage sources with 
a clean conscience to disclose noteworthy information to journalists.16 While it seems intuitive 
to offer source protection only to individuals who come within the latter category, it is 
incredibly difficult to decipher the motive of a confidential source.17 Furthermore, regardless 
of a source’s motive or conduct, any compelled disclosure may have a ‘chilling effect’ beyond 
the source in question.18 As stated by Sedley LJ in Interbrew, “the chilling effect of disclosure 
orders [is] an affirmative policy reason for ignoring motive in individual cases.”19 
That compelled disclosure has a “chilling effect” on the free flow of information to the public 
is widely accepted.20 It negatively impacts the newspaper against which the order is directed 
and inhibits future sources’ willingness to disclose information.21 If potential sources are put 
in the position of having to guess whether or not a court will order their name to be disclosed, 
they may not be prepared to take the risk that a court’s decision will go against them.22 
Comprehensive shield laws for journalists’ sources help to ‘thaw’ this chilling effect, thereby 
preserving the free flow of information.23 
B Is the ‘Chilling Effect’ Overstated?  
Some commentators are however sceptical of the chilling effect disclosure has on future 
sources and on the media’s ability to obtain honest information.24 They highlight that personal 
circumstances, practical realities and feelings of safety are what facilitate sources’ willingness 
to reveal information to journalists, not the wording of the law.25 Long-term considerations, 
such as whether a judge might compel a reporter to identify them some years later, have little 
or no effect relative to short-term considerations such as whether their name appears in the 
paper the next day.26  In his affidavit submitted in Police v Campbell, Steven Price played 
                                                             
16 Costigan, above n 1, at 474. 
17 See Interbrew SA v Financial Times Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 274, [2002] EMLR 24 (HL) at [42]. “Motive is 
ordinarily pure guesswork in the absence of a source.” 
18 Costigan, above n 1, at 474. 
19 Interbrew, above n 17, at [42]. 
20 Eoin Carolan “The Implications of Media Fragmentation and Contemporary Democratic Discourse for 
‘Journalistic Privilege’ and the Protection of Sources” (2013) 49 Irish Jurist 182 at 192. 
21 Financial Times Ltd v UK (2010) 50 EHRR 46 (Section IV, ECHR) at [59]. 
22 Camelot Group Plc v Centaur Communications Ltd [1999] QB 124 at 138 C-E. 
23 Carolan, above n 20, at 192. 
24 See Randall D. Elliason “The Problems with the Reporter’s Privilege” 57 Am. U. Law. Rev. 1341 (2007-
2008); Steven Price “Evidence about the chilling effect of ordering journalists to burn confidential sources (19 
June 2009) Media Law Journal <www.medialawjournal.co.nz>. 
25 Elliason, above n 24, at 1356. 
26 At 1356. 
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down the importance of source protection, stating “the fact journalists can be … compelled to 
reveal their source … has not deterred such investigative journalism as has occurred.”27 
While his statement is correct in that much investigative journalism does occur despite weak 
source protection at law, it is impossible to assess how many more sources would have come 
forward but for fear of disclosure. Sources are influenced by a variety of factors in deciding to 
give up information and isolating the chilling effect of disclosure is inherently difficult.28 
Though something must be said for the argument that sources do not care for the nature of the 
law, there is evidence to suggest that the stronger the perception of protection provided by the 
law the higher the quality of investigative reporting and the larger the quantity of investigative 
reports.29 This author is of the opinion that a perception of legal protection is at the very least 
of equal importance with journalistic honour as a consideration burdening would-be sources.  
Long before any protection was given to sources at law journalists were writing stories based 
on confidential information.30 However, this was made possible only by a strict and 
unwavering adherence by journalists to their honour and ethical obligations. Sources were 
assured that journalists would place their ethical obligations of confidentiality above the law, 
even if it meant imprisonment for contempt.31 In such a landscape it was not so much a court’s 
decision to require journalists to testify that had a chilling effect on sources but a journalist’s 
willingness to comply with that decision.32  
Today the landscape has changed.33 The notion that journalists must go to prison in order to 
keep a source confidential seems archaic and outdated. Furthermore a rule of practice which 
authorises contempt of court does not sit well with modern democratic processes.34 Although 
journalists today are still reluctant to give up their sources, they are far less likely to risk going 
to prison for their source. Instead it is now common for journalists to promise confidentiality 
only to the extent legally possible.35 In this landscape the chilling effect of a judge’s decision 
is likely to be far more significant than a journalist’s decision to comply. This paper contends 
that as the law has developed a nuanced approach to source protection through articulating the 
                                                             
27 Steven Price “Evidence about the chilling effect of ordering journalists to burn confidential sources (19 June 
2009) Media Law Journal <www.medialawjournal.co.nz> 
28 Price, above n 27.  
29 Eileen M. Wirth “Impact of State Shield Laws on Investigative Reporting” 16 Newspaper Research J. 64 
(1995). 
30 Fargo, above n 7, at 1064. 
31 Eady and Smith, above n 10, at 9-37; Attorney –General v Mulholland [1963] 2 QB 477 at 482. 
32 Eady and Smith, above n 10, at 9-37. 
33 Lori Robertson “Kind of Confidential” (2007) AJR June/July at 28. 
34 Eady and Smith, above n 10, at 9-37. 
35 Robertson, above n 33, at 28. 
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circumstances in which confidences can and cannot be justifiably upheld, the level of 
protection offered by the law has begun to weigh more heavily on the minds of sources, 
perhaps outweighing journalistic honour.36  
For potential sources who risk job loss, public ridicule and criminal sanctions upon revealing 
information, the extent of source protection offered at law is likely to be an important 
consideration.37 Stringent source protection should be encouraged in order to foster a 
perception that anonymous sources will be respected not just by journalists but also by the 
law.  
C A Comparative Analysis of Source Protection Legislation 
Today over one hundred countries have legislation enshrining the principle of source 
anonymity.38 It is recognised in national constitutions,39 criminal codes,40 national or state 
laws,41 reinforced in the common law and incorporated in international obligations.42 The 
range of protection provided under these laws varies greatly, but at the bare minimum they all 
give print journalists the right to claim they are exempt from testifying as to the identity of a 
confidential source.43 The extent of the protection granted often depends on a nation or body’s 
perception of the press and the weight given to freedom of expression.44  A brief overview of 
the levels of protection in jurisdictions with a strong influence on New Zealand and Australia’s 
jurisprudence is included to help frame the discussion on source protection in Australasia. 
1 European Court of Human Rights 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was established following the atrocities of the 
Second World War to ensure the enforcement and implementation of the European 
Convention of Human Rights.45 It places significant emphasis on protecting freedom of 
expression as a fundamental right and takes a liberal approach to source protection.46 As the 
linchpin for the protection of human rights in the 47 member States of the Council of Europe, 
                                                             
36 Robertson, above n 33, at 28. 
37 Camelot Group Plc, above n 22, at 138 C-E. 
38 Banisar, above n 14, at 21. 
39 See the Freedom of the Press Act 1949 (Sweden), art. 3.  
40 See the Code of Criminal Procedure 2000 (Fr), s. 109.  
41 See Evidence Act 2006, s 68; Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-208 (Supp. 2000).  
42 National Post v. Canada (2004) 236 DLR (4d) 551 (SCC); European Convention on Human Rights (signed 4 
November 1950, entered into force on 3 September 1953) article 10. 
43 The Open Society Justice Initiative and others Amicus Curiae brief in Sanoma Uitgevers BV v the 
Netherlands, December 2009 at 7. 
44 Banisar, above n 14, at 12. 
45 The Conscience of Europe: 50 Years of the European Court of Human Rights (2nd Ed, Third Millennium 
Information, London, 2010) at 16. 
46 At 17. 
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and the model for other regional human rights courts around the globe, the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence on the protection of sources is of great influence.47 
The ECtHR has heard a significant number of cases concerning journalists’ sources and has 
repeatedly emphasised that Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights 48 affords 
journalists the broadest scope of protection with regard to confidentiality. 49 Arguably the most 
important of these cases is the case of Goodwin v the United Kingdom.50 In that case, the court 
depicted the link between the role of the press and the protection of sources as follows:51 
[39] Protection of sources is one of the basic conditions of press freedom…without such 
protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on matters 
of public interest. As a result the vital public-watchdog role of the press may be undermined, 
and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely 
affected. An order of source disclosure cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention 
unless it is justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest. 
The Goodwin decision set the wheels in motion for source protection in Europe, establishing 
a minimum level of protection for all 47 signatories of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.52 It is clear from the decision in Goodwin that the ECtHR will order a journalist to 
disclose their source only when there is an ‘over-riding public interest’ in disclosure. This 
standard has been interpreted as requiring disclosure to be prescribed by law,53 to pursue a 
legitimate aim54 and to be necessary in a free and just society.55 The final criterion has been 
further refined to require a pressing social need for disclosure which must be convincingly 
established.56 It is also worth noting that the ECtHR grants source protection to all members 
of the press not simply to journalists. According to the Council of Europe Guidelines, source 
protection applies to “any natural or legal person who is regularly and professionally engaged 
in the collection and dissemination of information to the public via any means of mass 
                                                             
47 At 24-26. 
48 European Convention on Human Rights (signed 4 November 1950, entered into force on 3 September 1953) 
article 10. 
49 See Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123 (Grand Chamber, ECHR); Nordisk Film & TV A/S v 
Denmark (40485/02) First Section, ECHR 8 December 2005; Financial Times Ltd, above n 21; Sanoma 
Uitgevers BV v the Netherlands (38224/3) Grand Chamber, ECHR 14 September 2010; Nagla v Latvia 
(73469/10) Fourth Section, ECHR 16 July 2013. 
50 Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123 (Grand Chamber, ECHR). 
51 At [39]. 
52 Eady and Smith, above n 10, at 9-2. 
53 Sanoma Uitgevers BV v the Netherlands (38224/3) Grand Chamber, ECHR 14 September 2010 at [81]-[83]. 
54 Nordisk Film & TV A/S v Denmark (40485/02) First Section, ECHR 8 December 2005 at 12. 
55 Financial Times Ltd v UK (2010) 50 EHRR 46 (Section IV, ECHR) at [71]. 
56 Nagla v Latvia (73469/10) Fourth Section, ECHR 16 July 2013 at [96]. 
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communication.”57 Goodwin has been affirmed in later ECtHR cases, and as a result of this 
decision most Council of Europe member states have since adopted source protection 
legislation in their domestic law.58 
2 United Kingdom 
Although Courts in the United Kingdom must take ECtHR decisions into account, they are not 
binding on domestic courts.59 The United Kingdom has thus been free to take a more pragmatic 
approach to source protection, perhaps reflecting a slightly less rights-based jurisprudence.60  
Source protection in the United Kingdom is governed by the Contempt of Court Act 1981 
(CCA) which states that source disclosure is warranted only when “necessary in the interests 
of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime”.61 However the 
common law continues to have considerable influence on judicial decision-making.62 Before 
the CCA source disclosure was a question of public policy: a discretionary balancing exercise 
in which competing policy considerations of freedom of expression and justice were weighed 
equally.63 Although the CCA overruled this approach, requiring judges to decide whether 
disclosure was necessary as a question of fact rather than discretion,64 many judges were slow 
to adjust and continued to apply a discretionary balancing process thereafter.65  
Prior to the Human Rights Act 1998,66 the Goodwin line of cases exercised little, if any, 
influence on domestic courts in the United Kingdom.67 As soon as necessity was established 
as a question of fact a journalist’s immunity disappeared, leaving press freedom in the realms 
of discretion.68 However that Act heralded a fundamental change in judicial reasoning.69 It 
aligned the standard of necessity with that of the ECtHR and firmly grounded it in the principle 
of freedom of expression. Protection of sources now remains the pre-imminent interest, even 
                                                             
57 Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (2000) 7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of 
information (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 8 March 2000, at the 701st meeting of the Ministers' 
Deputies). 
58 Banisar, above n 14, at 15. 
59 Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2033 (HL) at [97]. 
60 Eady and Smith, above n 10, at 9-7. 
61 Contempt of Court Act 1981 (UK), s 10. 
62 Eady and Smith, above n 10, at 9-13. 
63 See Attorney General v Clough [1963] 1 QB 773; British Steel Corp v Granada Television [1981] AC 1096 
at 1196-1169. 
64 Eady and Smith, above n 10, at 9-87. 
65 Costigan, above n 1, at 471. 
66 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
67 Costigan, above n 1, at 473. 
68 At 469. 
69 At 472. 
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once the necessity of disclosure has been established.  In Interbrew SA v Financial Times Ltd, 
Sedley LJ stated that:70 
[32] … the effect of sections 2 and 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 is to require our judgment 
to conform so far as possible to the requirements of Article 10 [of the European Commission 
on Human Rights], and to take into account the [ECtHR]'s jurisprudence in determining what 
those requirements are. This must mean that, to be necessary within what is now the meaning 
of section 10, disclosure must meet a pressing social need, must be the only practical way of 
doing so, must be accompanied by safeguards against abuse and must not be such as to destroy 
the essence of the primary right. 
Courts in the United Kingdom thus start with the assumption that the protection of sources is 
a matter of high public importance, that nothing less than necessity will suffice to over-ride it, 
and that necessity can only arise out of concern for another matter of high public importance.71 
This is a strong step forward for source protection in the United Kingdom; however, the 
tendency of judges to engage in a balancing exercise means that protection for sources still 
remains lower than in the ECtHR. 72 In every source protection case to come before the House 
of Lords (now the Supreme Court) since the Human Rights Act, the journalist has lost.73  
3 United States of America 
The only case concerning journalists’ privilege heard by the United States Supreme Court, 
Branzburg v Hayes, held that journalists do not have a constitutional right to refuse to testify 
before a grand jury about their sources of information.74 This was a surprising result 
considering the First Amendment’s explicit protection of freedom of the press and it has been 
suggested that societal circumstances influenced the decision.75 The case was heard during a 
period of considerable civil unrest that saw police and prosecutors rely heavily on journalists 
for information about dissident groups.76  
Whatever the reasoning behind the decision, the effect of Branzburg on journalistic source 
protection in the United States has been significant. There remains no legal or constitutional 
recognition for source protection at the national level and there have been many cases since of 
                                                             
70 Interbrew, above n 17. 
71 Eady and Smith, above n 10, at 9-252. 
72 See Mersey Care NHS Trust v Ackroyd (No. 1) [2003] EWCA Civ 663, [2003] EMLR 36 at [69] per 
Tugendhat J. 
73 Costigan, above n 1, at 486-7. 
74 Branzburg v Hayes, 408 US 665 (1972). 
75 Vince Blasi “The Newsman’s Privilege: An Empirical Study” (1971-1972) 70 Mich L. Rev. 229 at 239-240. 
76 At 239-240. 
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journalists being sanctioned for refusing to disclose their sources.77 This is not to suggest that 
there is no source protection at all but it does suggest that it is unclear and easily overridden. 
In Branzburg, Justice Powell stated that for a subpoena to have merit, the party seeking 
disclosure must “convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and 
a subject of overriding and compelling state interest”,78 yet this has not been interpreted 
strictly. While in theory this test may be analogised with the ‘necessity standard’ in the CCA 
(UK), in practice Branzburg permits disclosure simply where information is relevant and a 
journalist is a convenient source.79 According to a prominent First Amendment lawyer, Floyd 
Abrams, Branzburg “left the terrain in a manner where much more legal work needed to be 
done.”80   
Fortunately, there has since been some recognition of stronger source protection in state courts. 
They have justified journalistic privilege on the basis of individual state constitutions, the 
common law and the federal rules of evidence.81 Some states have even established tests 
similar to the dissenting judgment of Justice Stewart in Branzburg.82 There appears to be a 
changing tide in American jurisprudence towards greater recognition of source protection. 
Perhaps if a case were to come before the Supreme Court today, the court would be more 
receptive of the argument that the First Amendment provides a qualified privilege for 
journalists, enabling them to withhold their confidential sources.83 
4 Discussion 
The legal systems examined above demonstrate that although journalistic source protection is 
not a deeply rooted principle at law, it is gaining momentum and is now afforded considerable 
weight in many jurisdictions.84 While the approaches discussed differ from those taken in New 
Zealand and Australia (see comparison on p. 24-25), an understanding of these differences 
promotes a more critical analysis of the Australasian position. 
                                                             
77 See Banisar, above n 14, at 90. Freelance writer Vanessa Leggett spent 168 days in jail for refusing to 
provide notes and tapes to the FBI; Judith Miller of the New York Times spent 85 days in jail for refusing to 
identify a presidential aide; and, Blogger Josh Wolf spent 226 days in Jail for refusing to provide an 
unpublished video.  
78 Branzburg, above n 74, at 700-701. 
79 See re Special Proceedings 291 F Supp 2d 44 (DRI 2003) at 47-48. Reporter Jim Taricani was convicted of 
contempt charges in 2004 after refusing to reveal the source of a videotape showing a local official taking a 
bribe. The prosecutor later admitted that he was able to identify the source without the testimony of Taricani.  
80 Monica Dias “Branzburg Revisted?” (2002) 26(1) News Media and the Law 4 at 4. 
81 Buchanan, above n 11, at 635. 
82 At 636; United States v Burke 700 F 2d 70 (1st Cir 1983).  
83 Kathleen Ann Ruane Journalists’ Privilege: Overview of the Law and Legislation in Recent Congresses (1st 
Ed, Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C, 2011) at 1. 
84 Banisar, above n 14, at 24. 
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III  Source Protection in Australia and New Zealand 
A Introduction 
The following will address how source protection was historically approached in New Zealand 
and Australia prior to the enactment of legislative protections in the 2000s and consequently, 
how those legislative protections altered the legal and practical realities of source protection 
in both countries.  
B History of Source Protection in New Zealand 
New Zealand has long enjoyed a healthy commitment to press freedoms, including source 
protection. Ever since the inception of New Zealand’s press in 1840 there is record of 
anonymous authors being protected and of journalists withholding their confidential sources.85 
In 1894 a Royal Commission was established to ferret out the source of leaked information 
which appeared in the Evening Post. The editor, E.T. Gillon, refused to appear when 
subpoenaed and publicly called the Royal Commission an “impudent travesty of justice.”86 
The editor regarded the duty to maintain confidential sources as “absolutely sacred.”87 
1 The newspaper rule 
In 1907 the newspaper rule, which protects newspapers from disclosing sources at pre-trial 
proceedings to defamation cases, was applied in New Zealand for the first time.88 In Hall v 
New Zealand Times Company Cooper J held that interrogatories asking from whom 
information was obtained will not be allowed in actions against newspapers, even where 
privilege or fair comment is pleaded and malice is directly at issue.89 Later Supreme Court 
cases such as McNab v Wellington Publishing Company,90 Isbey v New Zealand Broadcasting 
Corporation (No. 2) 91 and Brill v Television Service One 92 upheld the newspaper rule in 
relation to print journalism, radio and television. The overarching justification for the 
newspaper rule is consistent with the rationale behind source protection: the public interest in 
                                                             
85 Devin M Smith “The Shields Pierce Easily: A Case for Fortifying the Journalists’ Privilege in New Zealand” 
(2009) 18(1) Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 217 at 224. 
86 At 225. 
87 At 224. 
88 Hall v New Zealand Times Company (1907) 26 NZLR 1324 at 1326 (SC). 
89 At 1332. 
90 McNab v Wellington Publishing Company (1914) 33 NZLR 1362 (SC). 
91 Isbey v New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation (No. 2) [1975] 2 NZLR 237 (SC). 
92 Brill v Television Service One [1976] 1 NZLR 683 (SC). 
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the dissemination of information. 93 However it is limited in application, not extending beyond 
the interlocutory stages of discovery and interrogatories.94 
2 Evidence Amendment Act 1980 (No. 2), s 35 
Stronger source protection arose in 1980 by way of s 35 of the Evidence Amendment Act 1980 
(No. 2).95 Section 35 gave courts the authority to excuse a witness from answering questions 
or producing documents if to do so would constitute a breach of a confidence.96 This removed 
any doubt surrounding judicial ability to exercise discretion in allowing a witness to decline 
to answer questions, as had previously existed under the common law.97 Confidences were 
protected under s 35 if they arose from any special relationship existing between a witness and 
a source of information, including the relationship between a journalist and his source.98 
Section 35 required the courts to balance the significance of the evidence to the resolution of 
the issues in the proceedings against the likely effect of disclosure on the confidant or any 
other person, taking into consideration the nature of the confidence.99 When discussing Section 
35 in R v Cara, Potter J stated:100 
[35] The court must weigh the competing public interest in freedom of expression, pursuant 
to which the Courts have long recognised that sources of information accessed by the media 
may require protection otherwise the flow of information in which freedom of speech relies 
may well be curtailed or may cease; and the interest of an accused person and of society 
generally in ensuring a fair trial for those charged under law. 
The New Zealand courts approached s 35 cases in a similar manner to the common law 
approach of UK cases such as Attorney-General v Mulholland.101 Judges would exercise their 
discretion as to the competing public interests bearing on a particular case and decide 
accordingly. 
3 Law Commission criticisms 
In 1994 the Law Commission criticised s 35 on a number of grounds. Namely, the section 
placed a heavy burden on the party seeking to withhold information to satisfy the court of the 
                                                             
93 Campbell, above n 4, at [51]. 
94 At [51]. 
95 Evidence Amendment Act 1980 (No. 2), s 35.  
96 Section 35.  
97 Law Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at 109. 
98 R v Cara HC Auckland CRI-2004-004-6560, 2 June 2004. 
99 Campbell, above n 4, at [53]. 
100 R v Cara, above n 98. 
101 Attorney-General v Mulholland [1963] 2 QB 477.  
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necessity to do so, it was ambiguous on the issue of whether a source’s identity could be 
protected independent of a document withheld under the section, and it omitted to recognise 
the free flow of information as a matter of public interest.102 The Commission further noted 
the enactment of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 gave scope to base journalistic 
privilege on the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by s 14.103 
In 1999 the Law Commission proposed introducing an express qualified privilege for 
journalists’ confidences to the Evidence Act, which would shift the onus for disclosure onto 
the person seeking to have the source revealed.104 In 2006, s 68 of the Evidence Act was 
enacted in substantially similar terms to their recommendations.105 It offered journalists a 
qualified presumption in favour of source protection and overruled the common law. 
C Source Protection Today 
1 Section 68 of the Evidence Act 
One of the stated purposes of the Evidence Act was to protect rights of confidentiality and 
other important public interests, including the public interest in a free press.106 Section 68 
provides for that purpose by creating a statutory presumption of non-disclosure of journalists’ 
sources. 
The default position is laid out in s 68(1):107  
If a journalist has promised an informant not to disclose the informant’s identity, neither the 
journalist nor his employer is compellable in a civil or criminal proceeding to answer any 
question or produce any document that would disclose the identity of the informant or enable 
that identity to be discovered. 
In order to invoke the presumption against disclosure, an individual must demonstrate to the 
court that they are a journalist and that a promise not to disclose a source’s identity has been 
made. Once this is established all relevant documents and sources of information are prima 
facie protected. The court cannot depart from this position unless the public interest so 
demands.108 
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 2 Attaining the protection of Section 68(1) 
The wording of the statute is explicit in its application solely to the media. 109 Unlike s 10 of 
the CCA (UK) which can be invoked by anyone,110 s 68(1) is “limited and specific”, applying 
only to journalists and their employers.111 A journalist is defined in the statute as “a person 
who in the normal course of that person’s work may be given information by an informant in 
the expectation that the information may be published in a news medium.”112  News medium 
is defined as “a medium for the dissemination to the public or a section of the public of news 
and observations on news.”113 These definitions appear to narrow the scope of the section, 
suggesting s68 (1) only protects traditional forms of journalism, such as print and television, 
and does not extend to modern news mediums such as blogs. However this is a contentious 
and undecided issue currently before the High Court in Blomfeld v Slater, on appeal from the 
District Court decision of Slater v Blomfeld.114  
In the District Court Judge Blackie adopted a narrow approach.115  His Honour held that a blog 
website was not a means for the dissemination of news or observation on news and so did not 
deserve the protection afforded by s 68.116 Although no judgment has been given on appeal, 
the Amicus Curiae submission to the case provides insight into the scope of the statute.117 In 
that submission, Julian Miles QC discusses the definitions of journalist and news medium. He  
finds that ‘normal course of work’ requires a degree of regularity and consistency in activities 
said to constitute work; that full-time employment should not be a pre-requisite to journalism; 
and that a subjective belief that one is not a journalist is inconclusive.118 While he leaves the 
issue of whether ‘work’ should be construed narrowly or broadly to the court, he attests that 
there is little merit in constraining the definition to paid employees of the traditional media.119  
If s 68 is applied to bloggers and modern information mediums in Slater v Blomfeld, it will 
have a profound effect on the scope of source protection in New Zealand.120 
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 3 Level of cover under Section 68(1) 
If s 68(1) is successfully invoked, an individual can refuse to answer relevant testimonial 
questions and can refuse to produce documents that explicitly disclose their source or would 
enable their source’s identity to be discovered.121 A wide scope avoids parties seeking 
disclosure from using the reporter’s notes as a ‘back-door method’ of acquiring the informant’s 
identity.122  
In circumstances when a journalist refuses to give up his source in accordance with s 68(1), it 
is then for the court to consider whether the presumption of non-disclosure stands or whether 
it is outweighed by the public interest in disclosure (see s 68(2)). The right of a journalist to 
protect their sources should not be departed from lightly.123 In Campbell, Randerson J stated 
“departure will only be permitted after a careful weighing of each of the statutory 
considerations.”124 
 4 When is the presumption of non-disclosure overridden? 
Section 68(2) lays out the circumstances in which s 68(1) may be overridden. It is worded as 
follows:125 
A judge of the High Court may order that subsection (1) is not to apply if satisfied by a party 
to a civil or criminal proceeding that, having regard to the issues to be determined in that 
proceeding, the public interest in the disclosure of evidence of the informant outweighs: 
a) Any likely adverse effect of disclosure on the informant or any other person; and; 
b) The public interest in the communication of facts and opinion to the public by the news 
media and, accordingly also, in the ability of the news media to access sources of facts. 
This subsection requires a Judge of the High Court to weigh competing public interests in 
deciding whether to over-ride the presumption of non-disclosure. There is no evidential onus 
on the defendant requiring them to establish that the need for disclosure outweighs that of 
confidentiality; a judge must simply be satisfied, or ‘make up his mind’, that disclosure is 
warranted.126 This is not a particularly heavy burden on the party seeking disclosure127 and 
while it is commendable that journalists no longer have to convince the court of the need for 
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confidentiality, the broad ambit of this judicial balancing may allow s68(1) to be displaced in 
potentially unwarranted circumstances.128 
Judges are not required to show that disclosure is necessary as is required under the UK 
provision,129 or that the circumstances are unusual or exceptional as was argued by the 
defendants in Campbell.130 They must simply show that on balance the public interest in 
disclosure outweighs that of free expression. There is a risk that under the current provisions 
the Courts might prioritise the public interest in evidentiary disclosure at the expense of source 
confidentiality. This occurred in a number of cases before the enactment of this section.131 
 5 What factors make up the balancing test? 
The kinds of factors which must be considered when balancing public interests are not set out 
in the statute; however drawing on authorities from other jurisdictions, Randerson J in 
Campbell attempted to provide some clarification.132 
His Honour stated that in considering the weight to be attached to the public interest in the 
disclosure of evidence, it will be relevant to consider any other means available to obtain the 
information sought. If the identity of the informant can be obtained by an alternative route, 
journalistic protection should not normally be overridden.133 Furthermore the significance of 
the information to the prosecution’s case is a relevant consideration. The more crucial the 
identity of the informant, the greater the weight to be attached to the public interest in 
disclosure of their identity.134 It must be more than merely “desirable or nice to have.”135 In a 
criminal case, Randerson J viewed the importance of the charge as another relevant 
consideration. Prosecution for a minor offence is unlikely to carry a sufficient degree of public 
interest.136  
In terms of considerations weighing against disclosure, Randerson J stated that when 
considering any likely adverse effect on the informant or any other person, a determination 
should be made regarding whether the informant or any other person is likely to suffer some 
form of harm if their identity is disclosed.137 According to Julian Miles QC, this encompasses 
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a risk of physical harm or damage to property, as well as any loss of employment, status, 
reputation or any other adverse familial consequences.138 Regarding the public interest in the 
ability of the media to access sources of facts, Randerson J acknowledged that judges must 
consider the effect of disclosure on the reputation and integrity of the journalist concerned and 
any ‘chilling effect’ disclosure may have on members of the public who might communicate 
confidential material to the media in future.139  
6 What happens when there is a strong public interest in disclosure? 
Many cases concerning source disclosure are by no means black and white; for that reason, an 
order for disclosure does not directly follow from a finding that the public interest in disclosure 
outweighs the interests of confidentiality. By virtue of section 68(3), a judge may order full 
disclosure, he is no obliged to. 140 Subsection 3 states: “the Judge may make the order subject 
to any terms and conditions that the Judge thinks appropriate.” 141 
This subsection gives judges considerable discretion in borderline cases and means that a 
finding against the journalist may not necessarily entail disclosure of their source. Campbell 
was one such borderline case; Randerson J was willing to override the presumption in s 68(1) 
but did not order disclosure.142 In that case, the Police sought to uncover the identity of an 
anonymous man who admitted to stealing 9 Victoria Cross war medals and who had agreed to 
an interview on the plaintiff journalist’s show following the return of said medals.143 His 
Honour held that s 68(1) was overridden on the facts, yet having reached that conclusion he 
did not order Campbell (a journalist for TV3) to disclose his source.144  Instead his Honour 
asked for further details and related evidence from TV3 which was not protected by s 68(1).145 
He did not see it as necessary to order disclosure given that there were a number of other pieces 
of evidence which would likely prove sufficient to identify the thief for the purposes of 
prosecution.146 In so doing, his Honour implied that even where the public interest in free 
expression is outweighed, disclosure should be a method of last resort.  
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D Influence of Section 68 on Australian Shield Laws 
1 History of source protection in the Australian Commonwealth 
Source protection in Australia has followed a broadly similar path to New Zealand. The 
legislation in force today contains a presumption of non-disclosure, modelled largely off New 
Zealand’s s 68.147 However unlike New Zealand, a non-descript common law approach 
remained pre-eminent right up until 2007.148 While the newspaper rule offered some protection 
during the interlocutory stage of a defamation action, in other circumstances journalists were 
forced to reveal their sources whenever disclosure was in the interests of justice.149 A number 
of early cases explicitly confirmed that undertakings given to sources by journalists could not 
“stand in the way of the imperative necessity of revealing truth in the witness box.”150  
New South Wales (NSW) was the first state to provide some level of protection for journalists’ 
sources. In 1997 it incorporated broad statutory protections for professional confidential 
relationships in an amendment of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).151 Unfortunately no other 
Australian jurisdiction followed suit for another decade.152  Furthermore, this provision was 
not specific to journalists and a presumption in favour of disclosure rendered its protections 
practically useless.153  
2 A Turning Point? R v Gerard Thomas McManus and Michael Harvey 
Over the last 20 years, nine Australian journalists have been convicted for not revealing their 
sources;154  however, it was not until the highly publicised conviction of Gerard McManus and 
Michael Harvey for contempt of court in 2007 that the weakness of source protection in 
Australia began to gain public attention.155 These 2 journalists were each fined $7000 after 
refusing to identify the source of a confidential communication and their trial prompted 
widespread debate on the issue of source protection in Australia.156 The Commonwealth 
responded with the Evidence Amendment (Journalists’ Privilege) Act 2007 (Cth), yet this Act 
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was modelled largely on the NSW provisions and gave rise to the same misgivings.157 It 
differed only in limiting the protection to journalists and in favouring national security over 
other interests to be balanced.158 Nonetheless it can be commended for introducing some level 
of source protection, and for setting the wheels in motion for a number of member’s bills 
which sought to strengthen Australia’s shield laws.159  
3 Further amendments to the Evidence Act 1995 
In 2009 the Evidence Amendment (Journalists’ Privilege) Bill attempted to expand the matters 
which a court could consider when exercising its discretion on whether or not to protect a 
confidential source.160 Yet the Bill lapsed before being enacted. In committee the most 
common objection to the Bill was its retention of a presumption in favour of disclosure.161  
Less than a year later, 2 private member’s bills were introduced within weeks of each other to 
the House of Representatives (the Wickie Bill)162 and the Senate (the Brandis Bill),163 both 
addressing this very objection.164 The respective bills sought to provide for a rebuttable 
presumption that journalists’ sources be privileged; the Brandis Bill further extended the 
privilege to other professional confidential relationships.165 The former went on to pass the 
House of Representatives with bipartisan support and was enacted by the Senate on 3 March 
2011.166 The latter did not eventuate.  
4 Similarities between the Commonwealth provisions and Section 68 
The operative provision of the Evidence Amendment (Journalists’ Privilege) Act 2011, s 
126H, was based closely on New Zealand’s s 68.167 It contains an almost identically worded 
qualified presumption in favour of non-disclosure. Given the similarity, it is now appropriate 
to talk of the Australasian approach to source protection.168 Any points of difference in the 
wording or application of the Act are examined below. 
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a) Who is covered by the provisions? 
In the original drafting of s 126G (the definitions section), the definitions of a journalist and 
of a news medium were the same as in New Zealand.169 However, amendments moved on 
behalf of the Australian Greens broadened both the definition of journalist and news medium 
to be more inclusive of bloggers, citizen journalists and documentary filmmakers.170 The 
definitions as enacted differ from New Zealand in defining a journalist as someone who is 
“engaged and active in the publication of news” and in defining a news medium as “any 
medium for the dissemination…of news and observations of news”.171 These changes expand 
the scope of protection to include anyone engaged in the process of journalism, “no matter 
who they are or in what medium they publish.”172 While the New Zealand High Court may 
overturn Judge Blackie’s decision to deny bloggers protection under s68(5), as the law 
currently stands in New Zealand only traditional, paid journalists can be sure of protection.173  
It is also worth highlighting that the definition of informant in s126G remains identical to New 
Zealand in its focus on a person who gives information to a journalist “in the normal course 
of the journalist’s work”174 and so is inconsistent with the broader definition of a journalist in 
the Commonwealth statute. This inconsistency should be rectified to avoid confusion.   
b) Who can override the presumption of non-disclosure? 
In New Zealand only a judge of the High Court has the authority to override the presumption 
of non-disclosure, meaning the presumption in favour of non-disclosure is absolute in lower 
courts and tribunals.175 This restriction serves to limit the discretionary element of the privilege 
and ensure consistency. In contrast, the Commonwealth presumption can be overridden in all 
applicable courts.176 As the Act applies in the federal courts, ACT courts and in any other 
Australia court for an offence against the Commonwealth, there is the potential for source 
protections to be overridden in the lower courts and for an inconsistent approach to be applied 
between cases.  
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c) How has the Commonwealth source protection been applied in the 
courts? 
Section 126H has only been invoked in one case to date, the case of Ashby v Commonwealth 
of Australia (No. 2).177 Interestingly, despite the similarities in the legislative provisions, that 
case did not refer to the leading New Zealand case of Campbell.178  
In Ashby Rares J was required to consider whether a journalist could claim the protection 
offered by the Commonwealth legislation where the most likely source of the information was 
already publicly known as one of his informants. 179 In applying the statute to the facts, his 
Honour was of the opinion that if the informant had already identified himself or herself as the 
journalist’s source, it would be inconsistent with s126H to allow the journalist to refuse to 
answer questions or produce documents that would confirm what had already been 
disclosed.180 On that basis he stood the subpoena over for one week in order that the plaintiff 
might readdress the question of whether he was entitled to assert the privilege.  
Whether source protection can be claimed when an informant’s identity is already public 
knowledge is an open issue and Rares J was open to deny source protection on that basis;181 
however, it is concerning that he did not first apply the statutory presumption and then assess 
whether it should be overridden.182 The statutory presumption covered the plaintiff as an 
investigative print journalist who had obtained information on the basis of a promise of 
confidentiality.183 His Honour should have acknowledged this and thereafter engaged in an 
assessment of whether the public interest in determining the information outweighed the effect 
on the source, any other individual or the public interest in free expression.184 
This would have been consistent with the wording of s126H and with the approach taken in 
Campbell.185 Although it may not have altered the result, it would have set a much clearer 
standard for judges applying the statute in later cases. The approach taken by his Honour did 
not lay out a straightforward test or indicate the kinds of factors to be considered when 
weighing the public interests, suggesting that Rares J was not certain of the process to be 
followed and perhaps indicating that s126H will be interpreted narrowly by Commonwealth 
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judges.186 Of particular concern, his Honour made no outright distinction between sources 
which are already public known and sources which can be identified by other means. This 
casts doubt on whether independent avenues of inquiry must first be carried out before 
disclosure will be ordered.187 This principle is well-established in the UK188 and has been 
affirmed in New Zealand in R v Cara and Police v Campbell.189 It should not be departed from 
lightly. 
E Where Does That Leave Source Protection in New Zealand and the Commonwealth of 
Australia? 
The cases of Campbell and Ashby demonstrate that source protection legislation is difficult to 
apply in practice.190 In Ashby, his Honour struggled to apply the balancing test and while the 
approach of Randerson J in Campbell is to be commended, it demonstrates the inherently 
discretionary nature of the Australasian approach. These cases also demonstrate a somewhat 
disparate judicial approach to source protection in New Zealand and the Commonwealth of 
Australia despite very similar statutes. Some uncertainty continues to surround who can claim 
protection, who can override it and when the presumption will be overridden. As source 
protection measures have a chilling effect when they are perceived to be uncertain or narrow, 
we must attempt to remedy these misgivings.191 
IV Are we in a good position internationally? 
A Our Position Relative to Other Jurisdictions 
Source protection in Australasia has evolved considerably over the last 30 years, moving from 
a landscape of virtually no protection to a now strong presumption against disclosure.192 This 
is commendable and traditional journalists can now give strong assurance to sources that their 
identity is presumed at law to be confidential and will only be exposed in certain 
circumstances.  
On the other hand, even traditional journalists cannot promise to sources that their identity 
will be disclosed only in ‘exceptional or extraordinary circumstances’, or even only where 
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‘necessary.’193 If the public interest in justice is deemed to outweigh the interest in non-
disclosure, there is nothing a journalist can do to protect their source without being held in 
contempt of court.194  
On a spectrum of protection ranging from a presumption in favour of disclosure to absolute 
protection for confidential sources, New Zealand and Australia currently sit somewhere 
towards the upper end. The presumption in favour of non-disclosure, which can be only 
overridden when the public interest so demands, provides relatively strong assurance to 
informants that their identities will be protected. It is above the level provided at a federal level 
in the United States, where journalists must rely on a bare balancing of interests.195 Yet it is 
lower than the presumption in the United Kingdom which can only be overridden where 
“necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or 
crime.”196 
B  Is reform necessary? 
Given this relatively stable position comparative to other common law nations, dramatic 
reform is not urgently required; however it is essential that both New Zealand and Australia 
‘iron out the kinks’ in our source protection legislation. At present there are a number of 
weaknesses which threaten to unravel the protections if not addressed judicially or by 
parliament. 
 1 Definitions 
Some of the weaknesses inherent in our source protection legislation relate to how journalists, 
news media and informants are defined. In New Zealand they are defined too narrowly, risking 
exclusion for modern news mediums such as blogs.197 In the Commonwealth of Australia they 
are defined inconsistently, in that while bloggers are included, the definition of an informant 
still rests on the same narrow construction of language that is used in New Zealand.198 These 
definitions need to be clarified by the legislature so that they can be applied consistently and 
broadly in the courts. 
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 2 Teething Issues 
Ashby serves as a warning that the Commonwealth courts may not yet appreciate the precise 
nature and exercise of the protection under s126H.199 When the CCA was enacted in the United 
Kingdom, it was some time before judges fully grasped the meaning of a ‘necessity 
standard.’200 The common law balancing test dominated judicial reasoning well into the late 
1990s, with the consequence that the statutory requirement of necessity was not implemented 
appropriately or to a sufficiently demanding standard. 201  
While the disclosure standard in Australasia is not one of necessity, the legislation is still a 
considerable break from the balancing approach in existence prior. Both s68 (NZ) and s126H 
(AUS) establish a presumption in favour of protection but give judges wide scope to determine 
whether disclosure is or is not in the public interest. There is a risk that the same resistance to 
change as occurred in the UK may hinder judges from giving full effect to this presumption.202  
 3 Statutory Wording 
The Law Commission paper on which s 68 was based recommended that where possible a 
less-intrusive method for acquiring a source’s identity should be adopted. In other words, 
“alternative avenues should be exhausted before ordering a journalist to disclose.”203 While 
this was a consideration in Campbell,204 it was never explicitly incorporated in legislation and 
risks being forgotten as it was in Ashby.205 It is the opinion of the author that this is a principle 
of sufficient importance to warrant inclusion in statute, preferably as one of the terms to be 
considered before making an order of disclosure. Alternatively, the language of the statutes 
could be altered to permit disclosure only when the source’s identity is ‘highly material and 
relevant’ to the prosecution’s case.206  
C Foundational issues 
Source protection in Australasia relies on the presumption that judges are qualified to balance 
freedom of the press and trial rights in deciding whether or not to order disclosure. The use of 
the term “outweighs” in the respective statutes suggests that if a judge feels the scales tip even 
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slightly in favour of disclosure they are justified in compelling a journalist to reveal their 
source.207 Yet judges have more concrete experience with the court system than with the 
media.208 They readily understand the impact of withholding testimony or evidence, but have 
less comprehension of the impact on society of disclosure of confidential sources.209 Given 
this predisposition, any statute necessitating a balancing test is likely to unduly favour the 
party seeking disclosure.  
On this basis, a less discretionary approach to source protection is warranted. While the United 
Kingdom method is not fool-proof, its high standard for disclosure, that being “necessary in 
the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime” has 
merit.210 It is broadly consistent with the current approach; yet it directs judges away from a 
balancing test, and towards an exercise of objective judgment.211 It does not involve a trade-
off of competing interests but a question of fact as to whether the ‘necessity’ standard has been 
met.212 Importing such a requirement to Australasia would prevent judges from using their 
discretion to whittle down source protection.  
V Conclusion 
The level of protection which ought to be given to journalists’ sources at law is controversial. 
On the one hand, confidentiality enables journalists to present critical information to the public 
which may otherwise be unattainable; yet on the other, that same confidentiality prevents 
parties to legal proceedings from obtaining all the evidence relevant to their case.213 A judicial 
balancing of the two interests is the most obvious method for determining whether a journalist 
should give up their source, yet it presupposes that the scales are in equilibrium at the outset 
of the exercise.214 In reality, a growing international jurisprudence suggests otherwise.215  
In recognition of the need to protect sources more stringently, over 100 nations have 
implemented some level of protection in statute. 216 This paper canvassed some of the statutory 
provisions in jurisdictions with an impact on Australasia. It concluded that while the extent of 
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protection depends largely on a nation or body’s perception of the press, there is a general 
trend towards statutory recognition of a journalist’s right to protect their source.  
Recent developments in New Zealand and Australia are consistent with this trend. Both 
countries have reformed their source protection legislation in the last decade, and both can 
be commended for making non-disclosure the default position and for providing stronger 
assurance to journalists that the law respects their ethical obligations. Yet, both still contain 
elements of the common law balancing test and have proved difficult to apply in practice. A 
number of issues have been identified and some refinements have been suggested in this 
paper in order that source protection legislation be easily understood by informants and 
accurately applied by the courts, both in New Zealand and Australia.  
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